Views of a Nepali Economist

FLAWED NARRATIVE

Economic development in Nepal has never been inclusive. There is still a disparity based on geographical difference, ethnic groups and rural-urban divide. Minorities and marginalized groups continue to suffer under poverty. As a result, social exclusion and economic poverty are still strongly correlated. Seventy percent of the ‘untouchables’ and 60% of the indigenous population are poor. Over 42% of households in the mountains are poor while the figure is only 23.4% in the plains. Only 4% of households in Kathmandu valley are poor. The figure for urban areas outside the valley is 33%.

Poverty and lack of economic opportunities has meant that Nepal is losing its working-age population to overseas work. Around 65% of Nepalis who leave Nepal every day as migrant workers are 29-years old or younger. The other 35% are between 29 and 44 years of age. So, the Nepalis who leave are at the prime of their life. As a result, many Nepali villages in the hills and mountains have virtually lost all their working-age population to the Middle East and other migrant destinations. That demography of 15 to 44-year olds is the target demography of almost all the development programming in Nepal. When that target population is missing from most program locations, it becomes difficult for development organizations to carry out their mandate and programs. The trend for migration does not seem to be slowing down. Therefore, international and national development organizations in Nepal have a real problem in their hands in the coming decade.

This exodus, of mainly working age males, has not been all for the negative. In the absence of males, women in such locations have shouldered more responsibilities. Remittance income has supported them in this role. Their ability to venture into new responsibilities have been made easier because of remittance income which has been increasing each passing year. According to the World Bank, Nepal was the third largest recipient of remittances in 2013 with $5.4 billion. The 2011 Census showed that 25.4% or 1.4 million Nepali households had at least one member of the household living abroad. With the guaranteed financial support from remittance income, those left behind—mainly the women—have become more participatory in community work and decision making. For many, the absence of males has been an opportunity to participate in economic and social work which they would not have had a chance to engage in otherwise.

Nepal’s remittance story is sad. It did not arise because excellent Nepali workers wanted to go global to take advantage of lucrative opportunities overseas. It arose out of inequality and uneven level of development across Nepal. The Maoists exploited this inequality and uneven economic development to launch their revolution. The Maoist conflict has now ended, but the issues still remain. For example: despite having similar geography, demography and climate, the mid- and far-western terai are much less developed than the eastern terai. Jhapa, Morang and Sunsari in eastern terai are among the top five contributors of revenue to the coffers of Nepal government. But, Kanchanpur, Kailali, Banke and all other districts in mid- and far-western terai are decades behind in development.

The eastern districts also rank very high on human development indices. Residents of Jhapa and Sunsari are also disproportionately represented in the Nepali civil service. Similarly, hilly districts in eastern, western and central Nepal are much more developed than those in the mid- and far-west. Among the hilly districts, Palpa and Syangja are disproportionately represented in Nepali civil service. Kaski and Kathmandu are much more developed than similar hilly districts in mid- and far-west. It would not be a stretch to say that there has been a systematic exclusion of mid- and far-west Nepal from the development process. The Maoist conflict successfully exploited that exclusion but did not actually solve it.

There are many in Nepal who believe that the remittance economy has helped to narrow the development gap between the haves and the have-nots. They believe that the poor have been able to go overseas for work, and the remittance income they send home has helped their household enter the coveted middle-class. But, there is a story of exclusion and exploitation within that story. Manpower agencies and brokers charge a much higher rate from workers than advertised. The government has set a maximum fee of Rs 60,000 that agents can charge for sending a migrant worker to Malaysia and Rs 80,000 for Korea. However, agents in Jhapa last year were charging Rs 260,000 as fees for Malaysia and Rs 700,000 for Korea. This practice of extorting higher fees than what is allowed by the government results in exclusion of the poor from an opportunity to go to these lucrative destinations.

As a result, the poor either don’t go to these lucrative destinations or end up taking huge loans to fund their trip. The high rates make the trip affordable to only the middle-class Nepalis who can afford to pay such high fees. This exclusion based on affordability hurts the poor two ways. First, they are unable to go and work in places like Malaysia and Korea that have better working conditions and pay higher wages. Second, the problem of affordability forces the poor to choose locations such as the Middle Eastern countries or India where labor practices are sketchy and wages aren’t great. They are able to sustain a livelihood and be able to make their families slightly better off, but they will always lag behind the middle-class.

Nepal’s remittance story is not inclusive, and does not do much for the poor Nepalis. Nepal’s poor need a different narrative.

Jhapa’s refugee woes—then and now

Bhutani refugee influx in eastern Nepal made many Jhapalis unhappy two decades ago. Local governments were not ready to accommodate a large influx of people. As a result, public service delivery got stretched to its limits. The incoming group’s different cultural background brought frequent conflicts between locals and refugees. Slowly, the locals and the refugees adjusted to the situation, and the locals even employed refugees as cheap labor in construction and agriculture. However, now that many refugees have started relocating to western countries, many Jhapalis are unhappy, again.

It is not that there were no local conflicts in Jhapa before the refugees arrived. Arrival of Bhutani refugees and their subsequent resettlement in the eastern camps further aggravated many social problems in Jhapa. Youth unemployment was already a significant problem. After their arrival, the refugees provided their labor and services for cheap since they were not legally permitted to work. Local unemployed youths did not view this favorably, and conflict ensued. 

Refugees were also accused of bringing with them an acceptance of a culture of taking in multiple spouses.  Elders in local communities in Jhapa disapproved of this practice among the refugees. However, in the last two decades, the practice has seeped into local culture. As a result, recent generations of locals in communities next to refugee camps have also started taking in multiple wives. That has created conflict between older and younger generations of locals in communities surrounding the refugee camps in Jhapa.

Locals in surrounding communities also mention that, in comparison to the local population, the refugees were knowledgeable about medicinal herbs. They could identify medicinal herbs and plants in the forests around the camps. Since they were not allowed to work legally, refugees took to the forests and collected these herbs, and sold them as a way to earn an income. As a result, locals still accuse refugees of overharvesting local forests of essential herbs which ultimately affects the wellbeing of the forests.

Because their incomes were limited, refugees could not afford fuels and resorted to getting firewood from nearby community forests. As a result, locals still accuse them of destroying local community forests through excessive cattle grazing and cutting trees for firewood. The illegal use of community forests’ resources created a variety of conflicts between the refugee population and the locals. While blaming refugees for deforestation family and friends of a refugee that died in the camp were declined necessary wood for cremation by the locals and community forestry groups in multiple occasions.

Life continued in the refugee camps and in surrounding communities despite, even amidst, various disagreements and conflicts. Slowly the two sides learnt to live with each other. However, the locals who had failed to adapt to changing conditions had hoped that rehabilitation efforts by various agencies, such as the International Organization for Migration, would take care of the refugee nuisance, thus bringing the good old peaceful times back. But, current rehabilitation and resettlement efforts for refugees have not brought desired peace and harmony back in the local communities. Instead, resettlement efforts have brought new sets of problems.

There has been an increase in intra-camp conflicts between refugees who want to leave and those who don’t. Those who wish to leave cannot be faulted for their choice because they have remained stateless for over two decades now with no hopes of getting citizenship rights in Nepal. For the sake of their own future and of their children’s, resettlement to America, Canada or Australia is an enticing offer as it opens an opportunity of citizenship and larger rights instead of becoming stateless citizen for who knows how many more years. Also, many have accepted the reality that it seems highly unlikely Bhutan will ever accept them back.

However, a group of refugees who choose to stay behind in the camps abhor these asylum seekers. Those who have decided to stay behind claim doing so in order to keep fighting for their principles and rights. They believe that seeking asylum in the west represents a win for the brutal Bhutani monarchy and a defeat for those who champion democratic ideals. Resettlement has polarized the camp population into factions, increasing intra-camp conflicts. Many have been hurt, a few even killed, during demonstrations and subsequent altercations between the two groups.

Those that have successfully resettled in the western countries frequently send remittance money to their friends and family left behind in the camps in Jhapa.  While remittance money helps refugees in the camps to afford essentials and luxury goods which were beyond their means earlier, it has also fueled an increase in drug use among camp members according to the locals in the surrounding communities. As a result, locals accuse those left behind in camps as being “criminal” types who are going to affect and spoil the current and next generation of locals. Such accusations have further increased conflicts between refugees and locals.

There are also economic impacts due to resettlement efforts. Local entrepreneurs who had bought land and built shops by spending exorbitant amounts near camp sites have suffered huge losses after resettlement efforts. Land and rent prices have fallen sharply in the surrounding areas. Local youths who went for employment overseas because they could not compete with cheap refugee laborers aren’t coming back to work locally. So, local businesses now face difficulty finding sufficient labor. And, so, the local communities in Jhapa, surrounding the refugee camp sites, are back to being unhappy, again.