Friday, May 10, 2013
Does Nepali bureaucracy not want elections?
On March 25, 2013 Republica's opinion columnist CK Lal wrote an opinion piece titled "The system triumphs (click for direct link to the piece)" in which he accused the Nepali bureaucracy of not wanting elections. I disagreed with Mr Lal's views, and wrote the following opinion piece published in Republica on May 2, 2013. The direct link is here.
Critics of the newly formed interim council were quick to attack the council for being slow and not striving harder to hold elections in June. The current state of discussions suggests that it will most likely happen in November. In addition, some opinion makers were quick to blame state bureaucrats of being happy with current status quo, and accused them of trying to postpone elections for as long as they can. The implicit suggestion was that local bureaucrats tend to benefit significantly in absence of elected officials. The dread created amongst political activists in Tarai-Madhesh has been cited as an example of how this bureaucratic status quo results in despondency in the system. However, not many have actually bothered to ask the bureaucrats how they feel.
The fact that a status quo situation with no elections stands to benefit a handful of corrupt bureaucrats does not mean the entire bureaucracy is hell-bent on ensuring the postponement of elections. In the past few months, I have had opportunities to observe local and national level bureaucrats speak their opinions on popular public and political perception of Nepali bureaucracy. Contrary to popular belief, the bureaucrats stressed that they want elections just as badly as everyone else. They want local elections to be held before national elections. And many of us thought that they were happy with their current hold on power—handling local level duties of 22 different ministries and 58 different elected officials.
The perception of local bureaucracy being mired in corruption stems from a number of instances of corruption that have occurred and been reported. However, local bureaucrats suggest that transparency and accountability in municipal or VDC level governments is much higher when compared to other line agencies of Nepali government. Therefore, when local bureaucracy honestly reports and disseminates its transparency and accountability findings, Nepali media is quick to pounce on the few ‘negative’ instances in the overall transparent and accountable governance scenario. In other words, much of the perception about corruption in local bureaucracy is a creation of the media, according to local bureaucrats.
Although Nepali bureaucracy, especially VDCs and municipalities, get bad press for occasional instances of corruption, their role in keeping the country functioning during the absence of stable political government has to be lauded. Local elections have not happened in over 14 years, and elected representatives in local bodies have been absent for over 10 years now. In this entire duration, the fact that Nepali state has been functioning, and Nepal has not become a failed state, is a miracle with much credit going to our well oiled bureaucracy.
While accusing the local bureaucracy of mismanagement in decision-making, we have to take into account three kinds of pressures that local bureaucrats have to bear. First, decision-making in local level has to be done in a manner that appeases all sections of local society. Therefore, whether a VDC secretary or municipal executive officer likes it or not, he/she has to seek suggestions from local political actors while making decisions on complex problems. Any complex decision has to be taken with a political buy-in from all local political actors from all parties to ensure that they help in containing any possible public outburst against such decisions.
Second, although all party mechanism (APM) has been officially disbanded by the Nepali government, it still operates as the de-facto decision-making body in the local level. Earlier, when the APMs were created, they only had members from seven different political parties. Therefore, it was easier to come to a consensus in decision-making. However, the de-facto APMs of today consist of dozens of political parties—large and small—which has made decision-making very difficult in local government. Since each party wants a share of the pie, decision-making at local level has been obstructed incessantly in recent times, and productivity of local bureaucrats has fallen due to this obstruction.
Third, when the de-facto APM comes to a consensus and takes a decision, it is the local bureaucrat who has to take ‘ownership’ of that decision and abide by it, because the APM does not ‘technically’ exist in the eye of the law or national government. When questions are raised by activists and media about how budgets are allocated and how projects are undertaken, VDC secretaries and municipal executive officers are thrown under the bus by these de-facto APMs who do not come to the bureaucrats’ assistance in defending those allocations and undertakings.
It is very easy to accuse the entire bureaucracy of being corrupt and opposed to elections. However, the ground realities and interactions with local and national level bureaucrats provide a different understanding. Contrary to popular belief, local bureaucrats recognize that politics of opposition is necessary to make local decision-making process more transparent and accountable. They also realize that bureaucracy is an apolitical mechanism, and that is how it should be. Therefore, they demand local elections as much as the public. It’s just that nobody has been listening to what they have to say, because opinion makers are preoccupied with their own biases and opinions on how much the Nepali bureaucracy opposes elections.
Clearing the air
by: Mukesh Khanal
Critics of the newly formed interim council were quick to attack the council for being slow and not striving harder to hold elections in June. The current state of discussions suggests that it will most likely happen in November. In addition, some opinion makers were quick to blame state bureaucrats of being happy with current status quo, and accused them of trying to postpone elections for as long as they can. The implicit suggestion was that local bureaucrats tend to benefit significantly in absence of elected officials. The dread created amongst political activists in Tarai-Madhesh has been cited as an example of how this bureaucratic status quo results in despondency in the system. However, not many have actually bothered to ask the bureaucrats how they feel.
The fact that a status quo situation with no elections stands to benefit a handful of corrupt bureaucrats does not mean the entire bureaucracy is hell-bent on ensuring the postponement of elections. In the past few months, I have had opportunities to observe local and national level bureaucrats speak their opinions on popular public and political perception of Nepali bureaucracy. Contrary to popular belief, the bureaucrats stressed that they want elections just as badly as everyone else. They want local elections to be held before national elections. And many of us thought that they were happy with their current hold on power—handling local level duties of 22 different ministries and 58 different elected officials.
The perception of local bureaucracy being mired in corruption stems from a number of instances of corruption that have occurred and been reported. However, local bureaucrats suggest that transparency and accountability in municipal or VDC level governments is much higher when compared to other line agencies of Nepali government. Therefore, when local bureaucracy honestly reports and disseminates its transparency and accountability findings, Nepali media is quick to pounce on the few ‘negative’ instances in the overall transparent and accountable governance scenario. In other words, much of the perception about corruption in local bureaucracy is a creation of the media, according to local bureaucrats.
Although Nepali bureaucracy, especially VDCs and municipalities, get bad press for occasional instances of corruption, their role in keeping the country functioning during the absence of stable political government has to be lauded. Local elections have not happened in over 14 years, and elected representatives in local bodies have been absent for over 10 years now. In this entire duration, the fact that Nepali state has been functioning, and Nepal has not become a failed state, is a miracle with much credit going to our well oiled bureaucracy.
While accusing the local bureaucracy of mismanagement in decision-making, we have to take into account three kinds of pressures that local bureaucrats have to bear. First, decision-making in local level has to be done in a manner that appeases all sections of local society. Therefore, whether a VDC secretary or municipal executive officer likes it or not, he/she has to seek suggestions from local political actors while making decisions on complex problems. Any complex decision has to be taken with a political buy-in from all local political actors from all parties to ensure that they help in containing any possible public outburst against such decisions.
Second, although all party mechanism (APM) has been officially disbanded by the Nepali government, it still operates as the de-facto decision-making body in the local level. Earlier, when the APMs were created, they only had members from seven different political parties. Therefore, it was easier to come to a consensus in decision-making. However, the de-facto APMs of today consist of dozens of political parties—large and small—which has made decision-making very difficult in local government. Since each party wants a share of the pie, decision-making at local level has been obstructed incessantly in recent times, and productivity of local bureaucrats has fallen due to this obstruction.
Third, when the de-facto APM comes to a consensus and takes a decision, it is the local bureaucrat who has to take ‘ownership’ of that decision and abide by it, because the APM does not ‘technically’ exist in the eye of the law or national government. When questions are raised by activists and media about how budgets are allocated and how projects are undertaken, VDC secretaries and municipal executive officers are thrown under the bus by these de-facto APMs who do not come to the bureaucrats’ assistance in defending those allocations and undertakings.
It is very easy to accuse the entire bureaucracy of being corrupt and opposed to elections. However, the ground realities and interactions with local and national level bureaucrats provide a different understanding. Contrary to popular belief, local bureaucrats recognize that politics of opposition is necessary to make local decision-making process more transparent and accountable. They also realize that bureaucracy is an apolitical mechanism, and that is how it should be. Therefore, they demand local elections as much as the public. It’s just that nobody has been listening to what they have to say, because opinion makers are preoccupied with their own biases and opinions on how much the Nepali bureaucracy opposes elections.
Labels: bureaucracy, election, local government, nepal
Tuesday, February 19, 2013
Why federalism?
The following article was published in Republica on February 19 with the title "Why federalism?". The unedited version is below.
Why
federalism?
By:
Mukesh Khanal
Majority of Nepalis believe that Nepal should become a federal republic
with much decentralization of power. This belief is a result of the skepticism
that a central government cannot solve all of Nepal’s ills which results mainly
due to central government’s inability in resolving local and regional level problems.
A case study of Dang helps understand this skepticism better.
Dang
suffers from competition between farmers and the crusher industry over use of water resources. Farmers complain that
Dang’s crusher industry uses a disproportionate share of water. The industry is
blamed for running rivers dry because of which irrigation canals have dried up,
and Dang’s agriculture is hurting as a result. Also, of all districts in the
country, Dang has the highest concentration of cement factories. Locals report
that surrounding hills are being lost to these factories. Adding insult to
injury, these factories are accused of hiring mostly Indian laborers instead of
locals from Dang. This has created conflict and tension between locals and
businesses. Locals fear that this will only increase in coming days given huge
unemployment among local youths in Dang.
Locals
in Dang believe that these problems exist, and have been unresolved, due to
direct influence of national government at the local level with no veto power
in the hands of local government and local citizenry. Locals suggest that higher
powers in the central government pocket bribes from these industries, and grant
licenses to exploit the natural resources that rightfully belong to people in
Dang. As a result, operators of these businesses have not listened to local
people’s concerns and have been destroying local natural environment. Locals
understand that some hills would be lost to Dang’s cement and crusher
industries but they would not feel as bad if they helped generate more local
employment.
Land
and timber mafia in Dang have been active under the aegis of influential
national level actors in politics and in government. Productive agricultural
lands are being plotted and sold in
record numbers. Land mafia has been very active in capturing private and public
land. Land belonging to a local Sanskrit university has been captured by the
mafia. Land belonging to Swargadwari ashram and one belonging to the Sports
Ministry have been illegally captured by the mafia and are for sale. Similarly,
forests in Dang have been illegally cut down by the timber mafia in record
volumes.
Amidst
these exploits by land and timber mafia, locals in Dang feel helpless because
there is very little action that they can take except filing a complaint to
their local government. Local government is helpless because these mafias have
direct permission from national level politicians—and bureaucrats in Ministries—to
continue their shenanigans. A case against those that captured the land
belonging to the Sanskrit university has been registered with the central
government. Locals believe that resolution in that particular case would have
been quick and effective if local government had been given power to
adjudicate. As for other cases related to land and timber mafia, there is
silence from local government, local authorities and the department of
forestry.
Dang also suffers from exceptionally poor public service delivery. Nepal Electric
Authority (NEA) has been incompetent in providing electricity to dalit
communities and landless settlers. As a result, electricity is being stolen
with persisting disputes between NEA, dalits, landless settlers, and local
law-abiding community over the practice. Also, based on the policies
made at the central level, each farmer in Dang can only purchase 5 kg of
fertilizer from local government and cooperatives. Fertilizer dealers in Dang have been engaging
in illegal sale of fertilizers with farmers often having to pay two to three
times the actual price.
Members of a VDC with fertilizer shortage are not permitted to buy
fertilizers from a neighboring VDC that has a surplus. This rigid policy
devised by central government is hurting farmers in Dang, and has affected their
productivity and their livelihoods. As a result, some farmers in Dang committed
suicides this year. Locals believe that if the local government and local
citizenry had powers to determine their own policy and fate, farmers in Dang
would have fared better, not to mention numerous famers’ lives that would have
been saved. Amidst these problems, local government has remained silent because it is
powerless against central government’s policies.
Federalism and more decentralization do not ensure an across-the-board
increase in freedom in the local level, and may not necessarily result in more
development. That is determined by what functions of the central government are
decentralized and how effectively that decentralization is carried out. However,
education, health, counter-trafficking and social efforts become freer and much
more effective when decision making powers are decentralized to the most local
level. That will make local actors and advocates more effective in prevention
as well as cure to social ills. Similarly, resource allocation, public service
delivery and disaster response are more effective when decision making is
directed by local government with significant financial and logistical support from
central government.
As it stands today, under the rigid policies of central government,
Dang and its surrounding region are suffering. People are helpless as they have
no power and authority to go above and beyond the central government’s
policies. They feel that federalism—and subsequent devolution of powers to the
local or regional level under a federal state structure—is their only way of
choosing their own development agenda and fate. Not just Dang, but the entire
mid-west and far-west of Nepal have been neglected for years. Locals in the
mid-west and far-west of Nepal wait with patience for a federal state system to
relieve them of their sufferings.
Labels: Dang, federalism, local government
Subscribe to Posts [Atom]
