Views of a Nepali Economist

The following opinion piece was published in Republica on September 29, 2015 with the title "Great Indian Game." The direct link to Republica is here.


India has imposed an economic blockade on Nepal to please Madheshi leaders who believe a blockade would cripple Kathmandu. They are right. A blockade would cripple not just Kathmandu, but the entire country.

This is not the first time India has openly supported sectarian movement in its neighborhood. However, those happy with Indian support through the blockade have to understand that India often switches sides in such confrontations. A refresher in the sub-continent's history provides several examples.

In Bhutan, the Lhotsampas—the Nepali-speaking Bhutanese population who lived in southern Bhutan—had started a serious movement for democracy. Years earlier, in 1971, Bhutan had irked India by registering itself as a member of the United Nations. That soured the Indian plan to annex the country. Therefore, years later, supporting the Lhotsampas was an opportunity for India to hurt the Bhutanese monarch. So, India supported the democratic movement. Buoyed by the Indian support, the democratic movement gained further strength.

However, the Bhutanese monarchy was able to secure its longevity by brokering a pact with India. So, India switched sides. The Bhutanese monarch was able to subdue its people's democratic aspirations, and deport them out of their own country. India allowed the Lhotsampas to exit Bhutan and enter Nepal. Those who successfully re-entered Bhutan would be rounded up by Bhutanese soldiers, and put on Indian buses escorted by armed Indian security forces. They would be driven up to the Nepal border, and asked to walk into Nepal while the Indian security force aimed guns at their backs.

Although Bhutan remains an independent country today, and was able to foil India's plan to annex it, India effectively rules the country today by proxy—a price that the monarch was willing to pay to deny its people democracy.

In Sikkim, India came up with a grander plan. Although people in Sikkim had harbored democratic aspirations since 1947, the movement gained a boost in the late 1960s with funding and open support from India. Again, it was the majority Nepali-speaking Sikkimese population that was fighting for democracy in Sikkim. Lhendup Dorjee was the leader of the democratic movement at the time. Decades later, closer to his death, he would recount to several reporters how he received cash from the Indian government to fuel his movement.

While funding the democratic movement, India was also promising Palden Namgyal—then King of Sikkim—that India would not let the Namgyal monarchy end. Palden Namgyal took Indira Gandhi—then Prime Minister of India and daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru—at her word. Namgyal believed Nehru's daughter would never compromise a neighbor's sovereignty. He could not be more wrong. On one hand, Indira Gandhi had been promising to the Namgyal that the monarchy was there to stay. On the other hand, she had been funding the anti-monarchy movement.

The Indian establishment convinced Namgyal to hold elections in Sikkim to hand significant power to the parliament. Lhendup Dorjee's Sikkim National Congress party won 31 out of 32 seats in the 1974 election. Immediately, Lhendup's parliament voted to "merge" with India. The 300-year old Namgyal monarchy officially ended in 1975 when India annexed the Kingdom in broad daylight. Despite earlier jubilations at the ousting of monarchy, it did not take long for the Sikkimese people to realize that Lhendup had duped them. The result: Lhendup's party won zero seats in the 1979 election. However, the damage that had been done was irreversible. Sikkim's identity as a sovereign nation was forever erased.

In Sri Lanka, when the ethnic Tamils started their fight against the Sinhalese establishment, India felt a sense of obligation towards the Tamils, who had close relationship with the Indian Tamils in the South. Does this roti-beti relationship sound familiar? However, nationalistic politics took over—helped by increasing criminal activities by Sri Lankan Tamils in Indian soil (a charge that the Sri Lankan Tamils refuted)—and India switched sides. Sri Lankan Tamils felt betrayed.

Often history repeats itself. And, this time it is our turn. The Madheshi leaders and opinion columnists argue that India has played no role in the current struggle in Tarai. Yet Indian aggression through the blockade and pro-Madheshi sentiment speaks otherwise. However, history suggests the Indian support cannot be enjoyed for long. Pawns get used, and then discarded. Lhendup's career never recovered after the 1979 defeat. It is one thing to be called the "Father of the Sikkim Democracy," but another to have nobody attending your funeral. Lhendup Dorjee lived the remainder of his life in disgrace, and died in misery.

The South Asian experience shows that India's neighbors have to be cautious. We recently witnessed an overenthusiastic support for the current Indian Prime Minister from the Nepali public and polity. However, the Indian PM comes from a political history of oppression against minorities, and leads a political party that has used nationalism, jingoism and violence as political tools in the past.

A few analysts claim that India's current support of Nepali Madheshis is a tool to win the upcoming Bihar election. Let us hope they are right. If they are wrong, there is no question that Indian aggression in the border and involvement in a communal conflict in Nepal is a direct threat to Nepal's sovereignty and a direct question on our ability to resolve our own problems. Let us hope we don't have a Lhendup Dorjee among us to help them carry out their agendas smoothly.

Labels: Bhutan, blockade, deja vu, India, Lhendup Dorjee, nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka