Views of a Nepali Economist

The following opinion piece was published on October 14, 2015 in Republica. The direct link is here.

The 2015 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded this week to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, a group of four institutions. If we recall, the Arab Spring movement started in Tunisia in 2010, and spread rapidly throughout the Arab world, in the Middle East and Africa. As a result, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen saw an end to decades of dictatorial regimes. However, in the aftermath of the revolution, Tunisia almost faced a civil war due to social unrest and political assassinations. Formed in 2013, the Tunisian Quartet played the role of a mediator to transition Tunisia into a pluralistic democracy.

Although the award recognizes the Tunisian Quartet, it is a source of pride for mediation practitioners and supporters all over the world. The Nobel Prize validates the countless hours/days/years of contribution that mediators throughout the world—including in Nepal—have made in search of peaceful resolution to conflicts.

Nepal has a rich history of traditional dispute resolution, and most Nepali communities have their own dispute resolution systems. Most such systems make use of mediation. For thousands of years now, we have been a culture that seeks third-party mediation to resolve our disputes. As a result, Tharus have their badghar system, Sherpas have khada yangza, Thakalis have mukhiya system, and the Muslim communities have anjuman system. But, as the examples suggest, these traditional systems cater to a homogeneous group of people. As Nepali society becomes more modern, heterogeneous, and urban, these traditional systems have started to break down.

However, there have been efforts to ensure that despite the loss of traditional systems, Nepalis continue to have access to mediation for dispute resolution. Many local and international organizations have been working tirelessly to preserve and promote the culture of mediation in Nepal. In 1999, the UNDP's Access to Justice program started providing mediation training to traditional dispute settlers in several districts. DFID continues to partner with HUCODAN, a local NGO, in ten districts to run a mediation program for village-level dispute settlement.

There is more. JICA supports the COMCAP mediation program in Sindhuli and Mahottari. DANIDA/HUGOU runs mediation programs in four districts. PACT/SAJHEDARI project runs a program in six districts. The Asia Foundation supports mediation programs in 12 districts. It is not just NGOs and INGOs that support and run mediation programs. Even the Nepali courts have the Court-referred Mediation program.

In addition to these local level programs, there are mediation programs at the regional level to resolve regional disputes. UNDP supports one such program. The Asia Foundation's Regional Dialogue program in Jhapa and Dang/Banke resolves regional conflicts—anything from local governance to natural resource sharing issues—through informal dialogues between stakeholders. At the national level, there are several mediator groups.

One such group was able to broker an agreement between various political parties to pave way for the Maoists to come out of hiding and be recognized as a legitimate political force to contest in the 2008 CA election. Several mediators worked tirelessly through the first and the second Constituent Assembly to broker understandings on several constitution-related issues between opposing groups.

So, why is mediation so popular in Nepal? Informal mediation is popular with national leaders because it allows them to forge agreements outside the public view. The thinking goes that in public view (in the parliament and the media), a politician of one stripe cannot be seen agreeing and supporting the opponent's views and suggestions. At the village-level, informal mediation is extremely popular because villagers in remote Nepal have to endure days of travel to reach district courts, significant monetary costs in filing and fighting a case, and days/months of wait for decisions from the judges.

It is a costly affair for somebody in a rural remote village in Nepal to access formal justice system. As a result, mediation programs that offer their services at almost no cost and within the village have become extremely popular in Nepal, even in many cities.

Despite the success, not everything is right with mediation programs in Nepal. First, mediation programs run by different organizations have different success rates. The Asia Foundation's mediation program boasts a dispute resolution rate of over 85 percent, other similar donor organizations' resolution rates are lower, and the Court-referred Mediation program has a resolution rate of only 20 percent. Second, many donor organizations compete in launching mediation programs in the same districts, often in the same villages. That is counterproductive, and a waste of resources—both capital and human.

Third, differing curriculum and training practices has meant that mediators in some organizations are better trained than others. That results in varying qualities of services that the program users receive. Fourth, various government agencies—such as the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD) and the Ministry of Law and Justice (MoLJ)—are in a tussle to see who gets most mediation programs in Nepal under their umbrella. This struggle is partly for access to millions of dollars in mediation program funding and partly for grandstanding that comes with taking ownership of a successful program.

The point is: there are several issues in mediation programming that need fixing. However, Nepal's mediation programmers—local NGOs and donor agencies—have to be commended for their relentless effort in promoting mediation. For example, their efforts ensured that the Nepali state recognizes the resolutions achieved through informal mediation. That recognition came through the Mediation Act, which came into effect on April 14, 2014. The Act now provides legal validity to resolution agreements signed by disputing parties in informal mediation programs.

There have been significant efforts, both by government and non-government mediation supporters, to ensure mediation practices and programming in Nepal continue to improve and deliver. The Mediation Council, housed in the Supreme Court, is tasked with implementing a standard curricula and training for all mediation practitioners in Nepal. The new Act also gives the Council the responsibility to draft mediation-related rules and regulations. Some donors have recognized the need to pool their resources and knowledge together. For example, the UK, Swiss, and Danish governments have formed a "Governance Facility" to pool their resources and run mediation and other peace-building programs together in Nepal.

Mediation programming in Nepal has come a long way. Particularly in the last 15 years, a lot has been achieved. Yet a lot more still needs to be done. Let us hope the 2015 Nobel Prize to a group of mediators buoys the confidence and stamina of Nepali mediators for many years to come.

Labels: community mediation, conflict, mediation, Mediation Council, Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet

The following opinion piece was published in Republica on September 29, 2015 with the title "Great Indian Game." The direct link to Republica is here.


India has imposed an economic blockade on Nepal to please Madheshi leaders who believe a blockade would cripple Kathmandu. They are right. A blockade would cripple not just Kathmandu, but the entire country.

This is not the first time India has openly supported sectarian movement in its neighborhood. However, those happy with Indian support through the blockade have to understand that India often switches sides in such confrontations. A refresher in the sub-continent's history provides several examples.

In Bhutan, the Lhotsampas—the Nepali-speaking Bhutanese population who lived in southern Bhutan—had started a serious movement for democracy. Years earlier, in 1971, Bhutan had irked India by registering itself as a member of the United Nations. That soured the Indian plan to annex the country. Therefore, years later, supporting the Lhotsampas was an opportunity for India to hurt the Bhutanese monarch. So, India supported the democratic movement. Buoyed by the Indian support, the democratic movement gained further strength.

However, the Bhutanese monarchy was able to secure its longevity by brokering a pact with India. So, India switched sides. The Bhutanese monarch was able to subdue its people's democratic aspirations, and deport them out of their own country. India allowed the Lhotsampas to exit Bhutan and enter Nepal. Those who successfully re-entered Bhutan would be rounded up by Bhutanese soldiers, and put on Indian buses escorted by armed Indian security forces. They would be driven up to the Nepal border, and asked to walk into Nepal while the Indian security force aimed guns at their backs.

Although Bhutan remains an independent country today, and was able to foil India's plan to annex it, India effectively rules the country today by proxy—a price that the monarch was willing to pay to deny its people democracy.

In Sikkim, India came up with a grander plan. Although people in Sikkim had harbored democratic aspirations since 1947, the movement gained a boost in the late 1960s with funding and open support from India. Again, it was the majority Nepali-speaking Sikkimese population that was fighting for democracy in Sikkim. Lhendup Dorjee was the leader of the democratic movement at the time. Decades later, closer to his death, he would recount to several reporters how he received cash from the Indian government to fuel his movement.

While funding the democratic movement, India was also promising Palden Namgyal—then King of Sikkim—that India would not let the Namgyal monarchy end. Palden Namgyal took Indira Gandhi—then Prime Minister of India and daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru—at her word. Namgyal believed Nehru's daughter would never compromise a neighbor's sovereignty. He could not be more wrong. On one hand, Indira Gandhi had been promising to the Namgyal that the monarchy was there to stay. On the other hand, she had been funding the anti-monarchy movement.

The Indian establishment convinced Namgyal to hold elections in Sikkim to hand significant power to the parliament. Lhendup Dorjee's Sikkim National Congress party won 31 out of 32 seats in the 1974 election. Immediately, Lhendup's parliament voted to "merge" with India. The 300-year old Namgyal monarchy officially ended in 1975 when India annexed the Kingdom in broad daylight. Despite earlier jubilations at the ousting of monarchy, it did not take long for the Sikkimese people to realize that Lhendup had duped them. The result: Lhendup's party won zero seats in the 1979 election. However, the damage that had been done was irreversible. Sikkim's identity as a sovereign nation was forever erased.

In Sri Lanka, when the ethnic Tamils started their fight against the Sinhalese establishment, India felt a sense of obligation towards the Tamils, who had close relationship with the Indian Tamils in the South. Does this roti-beti relationship sound familiar? However, nationalistic politics took over—helped by increasing criminal activities by Sri Lankan Tamils in Indian soil (a charge that the Sri Lankan Tamils refuted)—and India switched sides. Sri Lankan Tamils felt betrayed.

Often history repeats itself. And, this time it is our turn. The Madheshi leaders and opinion columnists argue that India has played no role in the current struggle in Tarai. Yet Indian aggression through the blockade and pro-Madheshi sentiment speaks otherwise. However, history suggests the Indian support cannot be enjoyed for long. Pawns get used, and then discarded. Lhendup's career never recovered after the 1979 defeat. It is one thing to be called the "Father of the Sikkim Democracy," but another to have nobody attending your funeral. Lhendup Dorjee lived the remainder of his life in disgrace, and died in misery.

The South Asian experience shows that India's neighbors have to be cautious. We recently witnessed an overenthusiastic support for the current Indian Prime Minister from the Nepali public and polity. However, the Indian PM comes from a political history of oppression against minorities, and leads a political party that has used nationalism, jingoism and violence as political tools in the past.

A few analysts claim that India's current support of Nepali Madheshis is a tool to win the upcoming Bihar election. Let us hope they are right. If they are wrong, there is no question that Indian aggression in the border and involvement in a communal conflict in Nepal is a direct threat to Nepal's sovereignty and a direct question on our ability to resolve our own problems. Let us hope we don't have a Lhendup Dorjee among us to help them carry out their agendas smoothly.

Labels: Bhutan, blockade, deja vu, India, Lhendup Dorjee, nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka